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International Criminal Tribunals: A 
Review of 2007 
William A. Schabas* 
¶1 In its modern incarnation, international criminal justice 
might be said to be now about fourteen years old.  Following the 
bold experiments at Nuremberg and Tokyo after the Second World 
War, it went into a prolonged slumber, awakened in the early 
1990s by the new political climate that emerged as the Cold War 
came to an end.  In 1993, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) was established by the United 
Nations Security Council.  A year later, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR” or “Rwanda Tribunal”) was created.  
In 2002, the United Nations established its third ad hoc tribunal, 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”).1  The same year, the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court entered into 
force.2  The International Criminal Court (“ICC”) was fully opera-
tional within a year.  A fourth United Nations criminal court, the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, was authorized by the Security 
Council in 2007,3 but no trials took place during the year.  In paral-
lel to the activities of these new international institutions, national 
and so-called ‘hybrid’ courts4 also made their own contributions to 
the growing corpus of international criminal case law. 
                                                 
* OC, MRIA, Professor of Human Rights Law, National University of Ireland, 
Galway and Director, Irish Centre for Human Rights; Global Legal Scholar, 
University of Warwick School of Law; Visiting Professor, Queen’s University 
Belfast School of Law; Visiting Professor, LUISS Guido Carli University, Rome 
(2008). 
1 On the ad hoc tribunals generally, see William A. Schabas, THE UN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA, 
AND SIERRA LEONE (2006). 
2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome 
Statute].  See William A. Schabas, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT (3rd ed. 2007). 
3 See S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007). 
4 For the distinction between ‘international’ and ‘hybrid’ tribunals, see The Sec-
retary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
conflict Societies – Report of the Security-General, delivered to the Security 
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¶2 During 2007, the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda were in the advanced stages of their ‘completion 
strategy.’  Major cases were underway, with an ambitious target: to 
conclude trials at first instance by the end of 2008.  Each tribunal 
had a big question mark about future priorities.  The ICTY has yet 
to apprehend two of its most important suspects, Radovan 
Karadžić and Ratko Mladić.  They were the object of special con-
firmation hearings when the Tribunal was at its very beginnings, in 
1996,5 but have never been captured.  The Rwanda Tribunal also 
awaited an important suspect, the alleged banker of the 1994 geno-
cide, Félicien Kabuga, believed to be at large in Kenya.  The 
Prosecutor provided no clarification about the possibility of prose-
cution of individuals associated with the Rwandese Patriotic Front, 
a matter that has been under consideration for many years.  The 
Special Court for Sierra Leone completed its three multi-defendant 
trials, and prepared to begin what will be its final trial, of former 
Liberian president Charles Taylor.  As for the International Crimi-
nal Court, it was readying for its very first trial, of Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo (“Lubanga”), who has been charged with war 
crimes related to the recruitment of child soldiers in eastern Congo. 
¶3 This article will provide an overview of some of the 
highlights of the case law of the tribunals during 2007.  The vol-
ume of material is enormous, and any attempt to be comprehensive 
will stumble on superficiality.  Necessarily, then, this review arti-
cle focuses on only some of the major issues. 
                                                                                                             
Council, ¶¶ 40, 45, 46, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004).  See also Laura 
A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 295 (2003) 
(“Such courts are ‘hybrid’ because both the institutional apparatus and the appli-
cable law consist of a blend of the international and the domestic. Foreign 
judges sit alongside their domestic counterparts to try cases prosecuted and de-
fended by teams of local lawyers working with those from other countries.  The 
judges apply domestic law that has been reformed to accord with international 
standards.”).  On the hybrid courts, see also Daryl A. Mundis, New Mechanisms 
for the Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 934 
(2001); NEW APPROACHES IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: KOSOVO, 
EAST TIMOR, SIERRA LEONE AND CAMBODIA (Kai Ambos & Mohamed Othman 
eds., 2003); Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial 
Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 709 (1999); 
David Turns, “Internationalized” or Ad Hoc Justice for International Criminal 
Law in a Time of Transition: The Cases of East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone 
and Cambodia, 6 AUSTRIAN REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 123 (2001). 
5 Prosecutor v. Karadžić & Mladić, Case No. IT-95-5-R61 & IT-95-18-R61, 
Review of the Indictments Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (Trial Chamber I, July 11, 1996). 
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I. GENOCIDE, SREBRENICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE 
¶4 Arguably the most important judicial decision during the 
year in the field of international criminal law was the work of the 
International Court of Justice, and not one of the international 
criminal tribunals.  On February 26, 2007, the principal judicial 
organ of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, is-
sued a seminal ruling on the crime of genocide.  Its judgment con-
cluded litigation that had begun in 1993, when newly-independent 
Bosnia sued what was then called the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia and what had become, by the time of the 2007 decision, Ser-
bia.6  The Court addressed a number of important interpretative 
problems with respect to provisions of the 1948 Convention for the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.7  It adopted 
a relatively conservative interpretation of the definition of the 
crime, and rejected the suggestion that ‘ethnic cleansing,’ ‘cultural 
genocide’ and forms of attack and persecution directed at ethnic 
groups falling short of physical destruction are comprised within 
the concept.8 
¶5 The International Court of Justice placed great reliance on 
the factual and legal findings of the ICTY.  In effect, it treated the 
ad hoc Tribunal as a specialised and authoritative jurisdiction 
whose conclusions, within its area of expertise, were to be ac-
corded great deference.  The Court reaffirmed its earlier jurispru-
                                                 
6 Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Mon-
tenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. General List No. 91 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter 
Bosnia v. Serbia]. See also Antonio Cassese, On the Use of Criminal Law No-
tions in Determining State Responsibility for Genocide, 5J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
875 (2007); Orna Ben-Naftali & Miri Sharon, What the ICJ did not say about 
the Duty to Punish Genocide: The Missing Pieces in a Puzzle, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST.  859 (2007); Paola Gaeta, Génocide d’État et responsabilité pénale indi-
viduelle, 111 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 272 (2007); 
Andrew B. Loewenstein & Stephen A. Kostas, Divergent Approaches to Deter-
mining Responsibility for Genocide: The Darfur Commission of Inquiry and the 
ICJ’s Judgment in the Genocide Case, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 839 (2007); Wil-
liam A. Schabas, Genocide and the International Court of Justice: Finally, a 
Duty to Prevent the Crime of Crimes, 2 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 101 
(2007); William A. Schabas, Whither Genocide? The International Court of 
Justice Finally Pronounces, 9 J. GENOCIDE RES. 183 (2007); Christian To-
muschat, Reparation in Cases of Genocide, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 905 (2007). 
7 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time 
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
8 Bosnia v. Serbia, supra note 6, ¶ 190. 
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dence with respect to the ‘direct control’ test over paramilitary 
units,9 an issue that had been challenged in case law of the Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTY.10  The judgment also endorsed an ambitious 
interpretative approach to the duty to prevent genocide.11  Its insis-
tence that the Convention imposes an obligation upon states to pre-
vent genocide even when it occurs outside their own borders, to the 
extent that they are in a position of influence, and that they act 
within the confines of the Charter of the United Nations, dovetails 
very neatly with the emerging doctrine of the responsibility to pro-
tect.12 
¶6 The influence of the International Court of Justice ruling in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia was felt almost immediately by 
the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, which reversed its conviction 
of Vidoje Blagojević for complicity in genocide during the Sre-
brenica massacre of July 1995.13  The principal Appeals Chamber 
decision concerning genocide, Prosecutor v. Krstić,14 coupled with 
the dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen in that case, left 
trial chambers of the Tribunal in some disarray, and subsequent 
interpretations took the law in rather different directions.15  In 
Blagojević, the Appeals Chamber cited the International Court’s 
recent ruling as support for the conclusion that “displacement is 
not equivalent to destruction,” and that acts of ethnic cleansing 
perpetrated at Srebrenica could not necessarily be taken as evi-
dence of genocidal intent, contrary to what the Trial Chamber had 
decided.16 
                                                 
9 See id. ¶¶ 403-406 (confirming Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.) (Merits), [1986] I.C.J. 
14, ¶ 115). 
10 See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 137 (July 
15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadić Appeals Judgment]; see also Prosecutor v. 
Naletilić, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, ¶ 184 (Trial Chamber I, Mar. 31, 
2003). 
11 Id. ¶¶ 461-62. 
12 See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138-39, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005). 
13 See Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber 
I, Jan. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Blagojević Trial Judgment]. 
14 Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Judgment (Apr. 19, 2004) 
[hereinafter Krstić Appeals Judgment]. 
15 Compare Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment (Sept. 1, 
2004), with Blagojević Trial Judgment, supra note 13. 
16 Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 123 
n.337 (May 9, 2007). 
             A T R O C I T Y  C R I ME S  L I T I G A T I O N  Y E A R - I N - R E V I E W       [Vol.  6  
 
386
¶7 The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has confirmed, on two 
occasions, that genocide was committed during the Srebrenica 
massacre, but it has as yet not actually convicted anyone of the 
crime.  General Krstić was found guilty of genocide by the Trial 
Chamber,17 but the verdict was reversed and replaced with a con-
viction for aiding and abetting genocide.18  Blagojević was even 
more successful, in that the stigma of ‘the crime of crimes’ was 
erased entirely in his case in the May 2007 ruling of the Appeals 
Chamber, which overturned the genocide conviction altogether.  A 
trial involving several defendants concerning the Srebrenica mas-
sacre proceeded during 2007.19  In an interlocutory ruling issued 
only days after the International Court of Justice decision, the Trial 
Chamber declined to take judicial notice of the fact that genocide 
had been committed in Bosnia in 1995.  Its position places it in 
marked contrast with the Appeals Chamber of the ICTR, which has 
held that the Rwandan genocide of 1994 is beyond any dispute.20 
¶8 There are also very divergent views on the subject within the 
Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY, to the extent that a provoca-
tive mémoire by the press attaché of Carla del Ponte, published in 
September 2007, is to be believed.  Florence Hartmann’s book 
Paix et châtiment provides gory details of the Prosecutor’s battle 
with lawyers on her staff who were resistant to proceeding with 
genocide charges in the Milošević case.21  Ms. Hartmann obviously 
breached her duties of confidentiality and is arguably in contempt 
of the Tribunal.  She describes, for example, judgments of the Ap-
peals Chamber on access to Serb documents of which there is no 
trace in the publicly available materials of the Tribunal, and which 
were presumably ordered to be kept secret.  We may wait a long 
time to hear the other side of the story, as others may be more re-
luctant to break their pledges of confidentiality.  Prosecutor del 
Ponte, who completed her eight years at the Tribunal at the end of 
2007, has promised to write her own account. 
                                                 
17 See Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber I, 
Aug. 2, 2001). 
18 See Krstić Appeals Judgment, supra note 14.  
19 See Prosecutor v. Popovic, Case No. IT-05-88-PT, Second Consolidated 
Amended Indictment (June 14, 2006). 
20 See Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73(C), Decision on 
Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice (Appeals 
Chamber, June 16, 2006). 
21 Florence Hartmann, PAIX ET CHÂTIMENT (2007). 
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II. BALANCED PROSECUTION AND THE ‘FLIPSIDE’ CASES 
¶9 A great dilemma in terms of the selection of cases for 
prosecution has been presented by the so-called ‘flipside’ cases.  
At the ICTY, this has involved prosecuting a representative sam-
pling of Croatians and Muslims, despite the widely-held view that 
Serb forces were primarily responsible for atrocities committed 
during the conflict.  As a general rule, the sentences imposed upon 
the Muslims have been much lower than those for the Serbs, sug-
gesting that the crimes were not of comparable gravity and, possi-
bly, that they were not even within the threshold set by the Secu-
rity Council of “trying the most senior offenders of crimes which 
most seriously violate international public order.”22  The Security 
Council has told both Tribunals to concentrate on the most senior 
leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the relevant Tribunal.23  This section will examine 
the balanced approach to prosecutions in the Special Court for Si-
erra Leone, the ICTR and the ICC.   
A. The Balanced Approach at the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
¶10 The Special Court for Sierra Leone may have gone furthest 
in attempting a balanced approach to prosecutions, organizing 
three multiple-defendant trials, each of them focused on one of the 
warring parties in the civil war that raged through the 1990s.  Two 
of these, concerning the rebel Armed Forces Revolutionary Coun-
cil and the pro-government Civil Defence Forces, concluded in 
2007 with final judgments of the Trial Chambers.  All of the de-
fendants were convicted.  However, it became clear in the sentenc-
ing phase that the two sides in the conflict were not to be treated 
equally, and that a ‘just war’ narrative may emerge from the work 
                                                 
22 Tenth Annual Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecu-
tion of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitar-
ian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, ¶ 4, 
U.N. Doc. A/58/297-S/2003/829 (Aug. 20, 2003). See also U.N. Doc. 
S/PRST/2002/21; S.C. Res. 1503, preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 
2003); Ninth Annual Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Hu-
manitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia’, ¶ 6, 
U.N. Doc. A/57/379-S/2002/985 (Sept. 4, 2002); ICTY, Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, Rule 11bis, Rule 28(A), IT/32/Rev. 41 (Feb. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/rpe/IT032Rev41eb.pdf. 
23 See S.C. Res. 1534, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004). 
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of the Special Court.  The two leaders of the Civil Defence Forces 
who were convicted (a third defendant, Hinga Norman, died in 
custody in early 2007 before the end of the trial) of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity received relatively insignificant terms of 
imprisonment of six and eight years.24  By the time the judgment 
was rendered in August 2007 they were probably already eligible 
for parole, having served two-thirds of their sentences.  The Trial 
Chamber considered the support of the Civil Defence Forces for 
the democratically elected regime to be an important mitigating 
factor in determining the appropriate sentence.25  One of the three 
judges on the Trial Chamber voted to acquit the defendants alto-
gether.26  He took the view that their defense of a democratic re-
gime essentially excused their crimes, a position that may be po-
litically popular among some elements in Sierra Leone but that is 
utterly untenable from the standpoint of international criminal law.  
By contrast, the three leaders of the Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council were convicted and sentenced to terms of forty-five and 
fifty years.27  International humanitarian law is said to be con-
cerned with the jus in bello rather than the jus ad bellum, but it 
seems that when punishment is being meted out for violations of 
the jus in bello, the jus ad bellum may have a powerful effect. 
B. Case Selection at the ICTR and the RPF Investigations 
¶11 When the Rwanda Tribunal was being established in late 
1994, the Commission of Inquiry established by the Security 
Council proposed that the Tribunal be aimed primarily at prosecut-
ing those responsible for genocide, but the draft resolution submit-
ted by the United States referred to prosecution of “all persons” 
who have violated “international humanitarian law.”  The broader 
language would also authorize prosecution of members of the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front for atrocities in which they might be in-
                                                 
24 See Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, (Trial Chamber 
I, Aug. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Fofana Trial Judgment]. 
25 See Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment on the Sentenc-
ing of Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, ¶¶ 80, 86 (Trial Chamber I, Oct. 9, 
2007). 
26 See Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Separate Concurring and 
Partially Dissenting Opinion of Hon. Justice Bankole Thompson Filed Pursuant 
to Article 18 of the Statute (Aug. 2, 2007). 
27 See Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber 
II, June 20, 2007) [hereinafter Brima Trial Judgment]. 
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volved, including allegations of massacres committed after they 
took power in July 1994.  Aware of this agenda, the Government 
of Rwanda opposed including language in the Tribunal’s Statute 
that would allow such jurisdiction.28  In the Security Council de-
bate, New Zealand’s representative, Colin Keating, noted that “the 
focus of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is not on war crimes, but 
on genocide, as Rwanda had requested.”29  In 1999, when a judge 
refused to confirm charges of genocide with respect to an individ-
ual suspected of killing the Prime Minister and several Belgian sol-
diers, the Prosecutor asked to withdraw the indictment as it did not 
conform any longer to the priorities of the Tribunal, which were to 
deal with genocide.30 
¶12 It has always been an open secret, however, that investiga-
tions into atrocities attributed to the Rwandese Patriotic Front and 
its military wing, the Rwandese Patriotic Army, were underway.  
In her recent book, Florence Hartmann describes the resulting ten-
sion between the Office of the Prosecutor and the government of 
Rwanda, and defends the view that Carla del Ponte was replaced as 
Prosecutor of the ICTR because of her determination to proceed 
against the Rwandese Patriotic Front.31  But the book also shows, 
perhaps inadvertently, that permanent members of the Security 
Council wanted to remove Prosecutor del Ponte altogether, but 
compromised by allowing her to remain at the ICTY for an addi-
tional four-year term.32  The explanation that her mandate for 
Rwanda was not renewed in 2003 because of her zealotry concern-
ing the Rwandan leaders appears to be an oversimplification. 
¶13 Be that as it may, in 2004, the President of the Security 
Council called upon all States, and “especially Rwanda . . .  to in-
tensify cooperation with and render all necessary assistance to the 
ICTR, including on investigation of the Rwandan Patriotic Army. . 
. .”33  The Prosecutor told the Security Council that his office was 
evaluating evidence with a view to determining whether there was 
                                                 
28 See Raymond Bonner, U.N. Commission Recommends Rwanda ‘Genocide’ 
Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1994, at A13. 
29 U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
30 See Prosecutor v. Ntuyahaga, Case No. ICTR-98-40-T, Decision on the Prose-
cutor’s Motion to Withdraw the Indictment (Trial Chamber I, Mar. 18, 1999). 
31 See Hartmann, supra note 21. 
32 Id. 
33 Statement by the President of the Security Council, at 2, U.N. Doc. 
S/PRST/2004/28 (Aug. 4, 2004).  See also U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5016th mtg. at 
4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5016 (Aug. 4, 2004). 
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a sufficient basis for prosecution.34  In November 2004, Prosecutor 
Jallow told the Security Council: 
We are deeply aware of the fact that the investiga-
tion of those allegations falls within our mandate 
and our duty at the Tribunal.  We are also conscious 
that the Security Council is currently concerned 
about this particular issue.  Investigations have been 
conducted over a period of many years.  At this 
stage, as I mentioned to counsellors at the last meet-
ing, we are not conducting any more investigations, 
but we have started a process of assessing what ma-
terial has been gathered over the years in order for 
me to be able to determine what cases exist - and 
against whom - with regard to those particular alle-
gations of Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) in-
volvement.  I have indicated to the Rwanda authori-
ties themselves that I am assessing the material at 
the moment and will get back to them to advise 
them of the outcome of my assessment in due 
course.  This will hopefully take place early in the 
year.  That is the situation as far as the RPF is con-
cerned.35 
More than three years later, there was still no clarity on the subject.  
In December 2007, Prosecutor Jallow stated: “Since my last report 
to the Security Council, my office has also made progress in the 
investigation of the allegations against members of the Rwandese 
Patriotic Front.  We look forward to concluding this matter early 
next year.”36 
C. The Need for Balance at the ICC 
¶14 Issues of a similar nature also face the International Criminal 
Court.  Responding to the referral of the ‘situation in northern 
                                                 
34 See U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4999th mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4999 (June 29, 
2004). 
35 U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5086th mtg. at 31, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5086 (Nov. 23, 
2004). 
36 U.N. SCOR, Sess., 62d Sess., 5796th mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5796 (Dec. 
10, 2007). 
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Uganda,’ in mid-2005 the Prosecutor requested arrest warrants for 
five leaders of the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army.37  When the ar-
rest warrants were unsealed, in October 2005, both Amnesty Inter-
national and Human Rights Watch questioned the one-sided ap-
proach, and called upon the Prosecutor to proceed against the gov-
ernment forces as well.38  The Prosecutor responded to the criti-
cism: “We therefore started with an investigation of the LRA. At 
the same time, we have continued to collect information on allega-
tions concerning all other groups, to determine whether other 
crimes meet the stringent thresholds of the Statute and our policy 
are met.”39  But in 2007, there was no evidence of any interest from 
the Office of the Prosecutor in pursuing Ugandan officials for 
crimes committed during the civil war or, for that matter, regarding 
its military activities in eastern Congo. 
¶15 Thus, to one extent or the other, it seems that all of the 
international criminal tribunals have been wrestling with a cluster 
of issues relating to the motivations of those who perpetrate atroci-
ties.  International humanitarian law takes the position that this is-
sue is irrelevant, but it nevertheless rears its head in the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion about targeting of investigations as well as 
in judicial determinations of appropriate sentences. 
III. HATE PROPAGANDA AND INCITEMENT TO GENOCIDE 
¶16 In November 2007, the Appeals Chamber of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda issued its judgment in the so-
                                                 
37 See generally Situation in Uganda, Situation No. ICC-02/04-87, Decision on 
the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest under Article 59, Unsealed 
as of Oct. 13, 2005 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, July 8, 2005). 
38 See Amnesty International, Uganda: First Ever Arrest Warrants by Interna-
tional Criminal Court - a First Step Towards Addressing Impunity, Oct. 14, 
2005, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR59/008/2005/en/dom-
AFR590082005en.html; Human Rights Watch, ICC Takes Decisive Step for 
Justice in Uganda, Oct. 14, 2005, 
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/10/14/uganda11880.htm. 
39 International Criminal Court: Office of the Prosecutor, Statement by Luis Mo-
reno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Informal meeting 
of Legal Advisors of Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Oct. 24, 2005, at 7, available 
at www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/speeches/LMO_20051024_English.pdf.  
See also International Criminal Court: Office of the Prosecutor, Statement by 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fourth 
Session of the Assembly of States Parties, 28 November – 3 December 2005, 
Nov. 28, 2005, at 2, available at www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/speeches/LMO_20051128_English.pdf. 
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called ‘media trial.’  The accused were three prominent journalists 
who had worked for the racist newspaper Kangura as well as the 
notorious radio station Radio-télévision libre des mille collines.  
Many findings of the Trial Chamber were overturned, and specta-
tors attending the reading of the judgment by President Fausto Po-
car say they feared the three might be acquitted entirely.  But de-
spite the many flaws that the Appeals Chamber found with the trial 
judgment, convictions were sustained on several counts and the 
ultimate sentences were barely touched. 
¶17 The Appeals Chamber addressed important factual issues as 
it struggled to establish whether mere words could rise to the level 
of international crime.  In contrast with the Trial Chamber, it found 
that broadcasts of Radio-télévision libre des mille collines prior to 
the outbreak of genocide in April 1994 were not punishable acts.  
However, some of the issues of Kangura published in the first 
months of 1994 were held to constitute incitement to commit 
genocide and crimes against humanity. 
¶18 The Appeals Chamber upheld convictions for direct and 
public incitement to commit genocide.  It also confirmed that this 
is an inchoate crime, whose commission does not require any acts 
as a consequence.  This was all rather theoretical, given that in 
1994 the Rwandan media incited crimes that actually took place, 
and that were therefore punishable as complicity or aiding and 
abetting in genocide.  Thus, with respect to genocide, the legal 
findings are unremarkable. 
¶19 More significant is the Appeals Chamber’s conclusion with 
respect to hate speech or hate propaganda.  Already, in an early 
Trial Chamber ruling, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda had endorsed an approach to crimes against humanity by 
which hate speech formed the basis of a conviction for the crime 
against humanity of persecution.  However, the judgment was the 
result of a plea agreement, and it was never appealed.40  In the 
‘media trial,’ the Trial Chamber said: 
The Chamber considers it evident that hate speech 
targeting a population on the basis of ethnicity, or 
other discriminatory grounds, reaches this level of 
gravity and constitutes persecution under Article 
                                                 
40 See Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Judgment and Sentence, ¶¶ 
18-24 (Trial Chamber I, June 1, 2000). 
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3(h) of its Statute.  In Ruggiu, the Tribunal so held, 
finding that the radio broadcasts of [Radio télévi-
sion libre des mille collines], in singling out and at-
tacking the Tutsi ethnic minority, constituted a dep-
rivation of ‘the fundamental rights to life, liberty 
and basic humanity enjoyed by members of the 
wider society.’  Hate speech is a discriminatory 
form of aggression that destroys the dignity of those 
in the group under attack.  It creates a lesser status 
not only in the eyes of the group members them-
selves but also in the eyes of others who perceive 
and treat them as less than human.  The denigration 
of persons on the basis of their ethnic identity or 
other group membership in and of itself, as well as 
in its other consequences, can be an irreversible 
harm.41 
¶20 In reaching its conclusion, the Trial Chamber of the Rwanda 
Tribunal reviewed authorities from international human rights law 
as well as national legislation prohibiting hate speech, concluding 
that “hate speech that expresses ethnic and other forms of dis-
crimination violates the norm of customary international law pro-
hibiting discrimination.”42  For the Trial Chamber, the crime of 
persecution by hate speech could be committed even where there is 
no call to violence, or where violence does not actually result.   
¶21 This holding appears to derive largely from a misreading of 
the Streicher case before the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremburg.  Streicher was prosecuted for incitement to the crime 
against humanity of murder.  Although Streicher’s hate-mongering 
in the pre-war period was referred to in the Nuremberg judgment’s 
narrative,43 as a question of law none of the accused were actually 
convicted for acts committed prior to the outbreak of the war.44  
The Nuremberg judgment is thus not authority for the proposition 
that hate speech falling short of incitement to murder that actually 
occurs is punishable under international law. 
                                                 
41 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment, ¶ 1072 (Trial 
Chamber I, Dec. 3, 2003). 
42 Id. ¶ 1076. 
43 U.S. v. Goering, 6 F.R.D. 69, 100-102 (Int’l Mil. Trib. 1946).   
44 See Id. at 84-127. 
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¶22 The Appeals Chamber ruling of November 2007 was more 
nuanced.  The Chamber agreed with the trial judges that hate 
speech violated human dignity and was a form of discrimination, 
but it said it was not convinced that taken on its own hate speech 
amounted to a violation of life, liberty and physical integrity.  The 
Appeals Chamber held that it was “not satisfied that hate speech 
alone can amount to a violation of the rights to life, freedom and 
physical integrity of the human being.  Thus other persons need to 
intervene before such violations can occur; a speech cannot, in it-
self, directly kill members of a group, imprison or physically injure 
them.”45  Without overruling the pronouncement of the Trial 
Chamber explicitly, the Appeals Chamber found it unnecessary to 
determine whether hate speech alone amounted to the crime 
against humanity of persecution, given that in the case of Rwanda 
the various acts imputed to the media were part of a broad cam-
paign of persecution that should be considered as a whole.46  The 
Appeals Chamber held that broadcasts made after the beginning of 
the genocide on April 6, 1994 were part of this campaign and 
therefore constituted the crime against humanity of persecution.47  
¶23 The Appeals Chamber was clearly divided, and this is 
reflected in the equivocal language of its judgment.  In his individ-
ual opinion, President Pocar said that the judgment was not suffi-
ciently clear in stating that hate speech on its own could constitute 
persecution, the Rwandan case providing a perfect example of 
this.48  Judge Shahabuddeen appeared to share much the same per-
spective.49  On the opposite end of the spectrum, Judge Meron 
wrote a strong dissent in which, with reference to the drafting his-
tory of the Genocide Convention, he argued that “Mere Hate 
Speech is Not Criminal.”50 
¶24 An interesting feature of the ‘media case’ is the conviction of 
one of the three accused, Ferdinand Nahimana, on the basis of su-
perior or command responsibility.  As a general rule, superior or 
command responsibility has generated more heat than light.  At the 
ICTR, where there have been a few convictions on this basis alone, 
                                                 
45 Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 99-52-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 986 
(Nov. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Nahimana Appeals Judgment].  
46 Id. ¶ 988. 
47 Id. ¶¶ 988, 995. 
48 Id., Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fausto Pocar, ¶ 3. 
49 Id., Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, ¶¶ 7-20, 74. 
50 Id., Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Meron, ¶ 5-8. 
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its scope has been confined to war crimes, and the sentences that 
have resulted have been relatively light.51  The obvious suggestion 
is that superior or command responsibility is not nearly as serious a 
form of liability as primary perpetration.  The conviction of Nahi-
mana for genocide solely as a result of superior responsibility, and 
the imposition of a thirty-year term of imprisonment, stands out as 
a dramatic exception in this context.  The Appeals Chamber 
quashed Nahimana’s convictions based upon Article 6(1) of the 
Statute, that is, as a principal perpetrator or accomplice, but upheld 
his convictions based upon Article 6(3).  It reduced the sentence 
from one of life imprisonment as a result.52  A professor of history 
at the National University of Rwanda in Butare, Nahimana was a 
prominent ideologue and political activist in pre-genocide Rwanda.  
In 1992, Nahimana participated in the establishment of Radio té-
lévision libre des mille collines.  According to the Appeals Cham-
ber, Nahimana was the founder and guiding spirit of the radio sta-
tion, with influence over its activities and the content of its broad-
casts, but he failed to intervene to prevent the incitement.  Judge 
Meron, in his partly dissenting opinion, considered the sentence 
“too harsh,” given that “[d]espite the severity of this crime, Nahi-
mana did not personally kill anyone and did not personally make 
statements that constituted incitement.”53 
¶25 Nahimana might be said to demonstrate the real utility of the 
superior responsibility concept.  Nahimana was deeply involved in 
the operation of the racist radio station.  It was part of his more 
general involvement in the anti-Tutsi movement in Rwanda that 
culminated in the terrible events of April to July 1994.  But the 
Appeals Chamber said there was no evidence linking him directly 
to the broadcasts.  This recalls the judgment of General Yamashita 
in the final months of 1945, who was convicted for failing to inter-
vene when Japanese troops under his command pillaged the city of 
Manila.54  Perhaps, however, the result in the Appeals Chamber 
judgment is the consequence of strategic decisions by the Prosecu-
                                                 
51 Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgment, ¶ 481 (Trial Chamber 
II, Jan. 31, 2005); Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Judg-
ment, ¶ 2084 (Trial Chamber II, Mar. 15, 2006); Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. 
IT-03-68-T, Judgment, ¶ 783 (Trial Chamber II, June 30, 2006). 
52 Nahimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 45, ¶ 1052.  
53 Id., Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Meron, ¶ 22. 
54 U.S. v. Yamashita, 4 L.R.T.W.C. 1, 36-37 (1948). See also In re Yamashita, 
327 US 1 (1945). 
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tor, who might well have approached the issue in another manner.  
Nahimana could have been charged as part of a joint criminal en-
terprise to incite genocide, one for which he would then readily 
have been convicted as the directing mind of a notorious radio sta-
tion whose broadcasts dramatically contributed to the carnage.  
Such an approach might also more accurately describe his culpa-
bility.  As a mastermind of the racist campaign against the Tutsi, 
his real crime must have been so much more than simply failing to 
supervise his subalterns.  Indeed, how else can a thirty-year sen-
tence be explained? 
IV. TRANSFERRING CASES BACK TO NATIONAL COURTS 
¶26 Rather like the hungry man or woman at an ‘all you can eat’ 
buffet, the ad hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda filled their plates only to discover that they could not di-
gest everything.  By 2003, the Security Council was insisting that 
they wind up their activities.  One way to do this was to transfer 
cases to national jurisdictions, a process that began in 2005.  
Transfers of individuals who have already been indicted, whether 
or not they are in custody, require the authorization of a Trial 
Chamber or a three-judge ‘Referral Bench.’  One of the interesting 
features of the applicable law, the result of Rule 11 bis of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence of the two tribunals, is the possibility of 
transferring cases to states with no traditional jurisdictional link to 
the crime or the offender, in accordance with the principle of uni-
versality.  By the beginning of 2007, several transfers had been 
successfully accomplished, with accused persons being sent to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina for trial before special chambers of the 
national justice system.55 
¶27 At the ICTR, the process began more slowly.  By the 
beginning of 2007, only one application had been made for trans-
fer, to Norway, and it had been denied by the judges because of 
inadequacies in Norwegian legislation.56  In 2007, the Prosecutor 
applied for and obtained the transfer of the same case to the Neth-
                                                 
55 See Michael Bohlander, Last Exit Bosnia – Transferring War Crimes Prose-
cution for the International Tribunal to Domestic Courts, 14 CRIM. L.F. 59 
(2003); Mark S. Ellis, Coming to Terms with its Past - Serbia's New Court for 
the Prosecution of War Crimes, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 165 (2004). 
56 See Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR 05-86-AR11bis, Decision on 
Rule 11bis Appeal (Appeals Chamber, Aug. 30, 2006). 
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erlands.57  The ruling of the Trial Chamber was not appealed, given 
that the accused himself much preferred trial in Europe to any of 
the alternatives, including the threat of transfer to Rwanda itself.  
But in August 2007, a ruling of the Dutch national courts in an un-
related case established a precedent that cast doubts on the pros-
pect of effective prosecution of Bagaragaza in the Netherlands.  
The Prosecutor demanded that Bagaragaza be returned to the cus-
tody of the International Tribunal, and that the transfer order be 
rescinded.  By the end of the year, Bagaragaza’s fate was uncer-
tain.  He had been in custody in The Hague awaiting transfer to a 
national jurisdiction for two years. 
¶28 The Prosecutor has regularly lamented the fact that few 
countries have shown any interest in prosecuting transfer cases 
from the Rwanda Tribunal.  The big exception to this is Rwanda 
itself, which actually resents transfer to other jurisdictions and con-
siders that its courts are the natural forum for genocide trials that 
the International Tribunal will not undertake.  Prior to 2007, in the 
bi-annual reports to the Security Council on the completion strat-
egy, the Prosecutor had expressed his concern that Rwanda’s 
courts were not in a position to take cases.  He spoke of problems 
of capacity within the national justice system as well as the possi-
bility of capital punishment, which remained an option under 
Rwandan law.58  In March 2007, the Rwandan parliament enacted 
legislation providing for a special legal regime for cases trans-
ferred by the Tribunal, and clarified the fact that there would be no 
capital punishment.59 
¶29 The first application for transfer of a case to Rwanda was 
filed by the Prosecutor in June 2007.60  Because the accused was 
not in custody, it was unlikely that there would be much opposition 
to the proceedings.  Then, human rights NGOs intervened to op-
                                                 
57 See Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-2005-86-R11bis, Decision on 
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of the Indictment to the Kingdom of the Neth-
erlands (Trial Chamber III, Apr. 13 2007). 
58 See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5594th mtg. at 13-4, UN Doc. S/PV.5594 
(Dec. 15, 2006). 
59 Organic Law No. 11/2007 of 16/03/2007, Concerning Transfer of Cases to the 
Republic of Rwanda from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and 
from Other States, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, Year 46, Special 
issue of 19 March 2007, p. 22. 
60 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 01-67-I, Request for the Referral of 
the Case of Fulgence Kayishema to Rwanda pursuant to Rule 11 bis of the Tri-
bunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence (June 11, 2007). 
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pose the transfers, arguing that the Rwandan courts could not de-
liver trials that would be acceptable under international standards.61  
When the Prosecutor informed the Security Council of the first ap-
plication for referral to Rwanda, in June 2007, he said that if it 
were successful, others would follow.62  By the end of the year, the 
first case had not yet been heard.  However, the Prosecutor chose 
to proceed with additional applications in other cases. 
¶30 The Prosecutor also applied for transfer of two cases to 
France.  These involved accused persons who were already in 
France.  The transfers were not contested, and no NGOs com-
plained about the French justice system.63  Only Rwanda was un-
happy, and it said as much to the Security Council when it learned 
of the transfers.  The Rwandan representative said: “My Govern-
ment has serious concerns about this – principally because well-
known fugitives at large continue to live in that country with im-
punity.  We intend to raise this issue with the appropriate authori-
ties at the highest level.”64 
¶31 At the ICTY, where transfer has become almost routine, the 
Appeals Chamber intervened to deny the Prosecutor’s request to 
transfer the case of Milan Lukić after it had been authorized by a 
Referral Bench.  Lukić had been a leader of the White Eagles, a 
paramilitary organization.  He was arrested in Argentina in 2005, 
and subsequently transferred to the Tribunal in The Hague.  In 
April 2007, the Prosecutor obtained authorization to transfer the 
accused to the national courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the 
                                                 
61 See Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 2001-67-I, Brief of Human 
Rights Watch as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to Rule 11 bis Transfer (Jan. 3, 
2008); Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 2001-67-I, Brief of Amicus 
Curiae, International Criminal Defence Attorneys Association (ICDAA), Con-
cerning the Request for Refferral [sic] of the Accused to Rwanda Pursuant to 
Rule 11 Bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Rule 74 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence) (Jan. 3, 2008). 
62 U.N. SCOR, 62nd Sess., 5697th mtg. at 15, UN Doc. S/PV.5697 (June 18, 
2007). 
63 Prosecutor v. Bucyibaruta, Case No. ICTR 2005-86-I, Décision relative à la 
requête du Procureur aux fins de renvoi de l’acte d’accusation contre Laurent 
Bucyibaruta aux autorités françaises [Decision relating to the request of the 
Prosecutor for purposes of referral of the bill of indictment against Laurent Bu-
cyibaruta to the French authorities] (Trial Chamber III, Nov. 20, 2007); Prosecu-
tor v. Munyeshyaka, Case No. ICTR 2005-87-I, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Request for the Referral of Wenceslas Munyeshyaka’s Indictment to France 
(Trial Chamber III, Nov. 20, 2007). 
64 U.N. SCOR, 62nd Sess., 5697th mtg. at 32, UN Doc. S/PV.5697 (June 18, 
2007). 
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ground that Lukić was not one of the “most senior leaders” and 
that as a result trial before the International Tribunal was not ap-
propriate.65  One of the bizarre features of such litigation is that 
sometimes, as in this case, it is the accused who appeals the trans-
fer, arguing that he is in effect worse than the Prosecutor has por-
trayed him.  The Appeals Chamber confirmed that paramilitary 
leaders could be tried at either level, national or international, but it 
felt the Trial Chamber had underestimated the significance of the 
accused.  The Trial Chamber had focused on the local dimension 
of his influence, but for the Appeals Chamber, “within his own 
sphere, he was a dominant presence.”66  Given the importance of 
prosecuting paramilitary leaders, the Appeals Chamber ordered 
that trial take place before the International Tribunal and not the 
national courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.67 
V. JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE ON A BROAD SCALE 
¶32 The doctrine of ‘joint criminal enterprise’ has been at the 
core of the complicity paradigm of the Tribunals since it was first 
enunciated in the ICTY Appeals Chamber decision in Tadić.68  Not 
set out explicitly in the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, the concept 
was developed with reference to theories of organized crime in na-
tional legal systems as well as precedents established in the post-
World War II decisions.  In the leading case, Tadić, the accused 
was convicted for murders committed by his associates as part of a 
raid on a Muslim community.  The doctrine was conceived of as 
applicable to criminal activity on a relatively small and localized 
scale, as it had been in Tadić.  Its relevance to much broader forms 
of criminal activity remained a matter in dispute until the Appeals 
Chamber, in April 2007, confirmed that big fish as well as small 
fry could be part of a joint criminal enterprise. 
                                                 
65 Prosecutor v. Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-PT, Decision on Referral of Case 
Pursuant to Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annex A and Annex B, ¶ 29-30 (Re-
ferral Bench, Apr. 5 2007). 
66 Prosecutor v. Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-AR11bis.1, Decision on Milan 
Lukić’s Appeal Regarding Referral, ¶ 21 (Appeals Chamber, July 11, 2007). 
67 Id. ¶ 28. 
68 Tadić Appeals Judgment, supra note 10, ¶ 220.  
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A. The Brđanin Case 
¶33 In September 2004, charges based upon joint criminal 
enterprise had been dismissed by an ICTY Trial Chamber in the 
trial of Radoslav Brđanin.69  The accused had served as president of 
the ‘Crisis Group’ of the Autonomous Region of Krajina.  Relying 
upon earlier formulations by the Appeals Chamber, the Trial 
Chamber concluded that the joint criminal enterprise theory was 
inapplicable.  It held that the primary perpetrator of the criminal 
act must be a member of the joint criminal enterprise.70  The con-
sequence was to confine the doctrine to small groups, and to ex-
clude its relevance to large scale criminal plans in which the pri-
mary perpetrator may even be ignorant of the overall intentions of 
the leaders and organizers. 
¶34 The ICTY Appeals Chamber reversed the legal findings of 
the Trial Chamber, thereby holding that joint criminal enterprise 
was applicable not only to ‘small cases’ but to large-scale criminal 
enterprises involving primary perpetrators or offenders who are 
personally outside of the common plan.  Referring to two post-
World War II cases, the Appeals Chamber said it found strong 
support for the imposition of criminal liability upon an accused for 
participation in a common criminal purpose, “where the conduct 
that comprises the criminal actus reus is perpetrated by persons 
who do not share the common purpose.”  There is no requirement 
of proof “that there was an understanding or an agreement to 
commit that particular crime between the accused and the principal 
perpetrator of the crime.”71 
¶35 One of the authorities relied upon by the Brđanin Appeals 
Chamber, known as the Justice Case, involved prosecution of lead-
ing judges, magistrates and prosecutors for their role in implement-
ing the racist and genocidal Nazi policy.72  The Appeals Chamber 
cited one of the conclusions in the Justice Case: “The material 
facts which must be proved in any case are (1) the fact of the great 
pattern or plan of racial persecution and extermination; and (2) 
specific conduct of the individual defendant in furtherance of the 
                                                 
69 Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 355-356 (Trial 
Chamber II, Sept. 1, 2004). 
70 See id. 
71 Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 394 (Apr. 
3, 2007) [hereinafter Brđanin Appeals Judgment]. 
72 U.S. v. Alstötter (“Justice Trial”),  3 T.W.C. 1, 6 L.R.T.W.C. 1, 14 Ann. Dig. 
278 (U.S. Mil. Trib. 1948). 
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plan.  This is but an application of general concepts of criminal 
law.”73  Interestingly, in a 2002 ruling where it decided that crimes 
against humanity need not be committed pursuant to a state policy, 
the same Appeals Chamber described the Justice Case as “not to 
constitute an authoritative statement of customary international 
law.”74 
¶36 The Appeals Chamber relied heavily on the analysis of Judge 
Iain Bonomy in his separate opinion in a preliminary ruling in 
Milutinović the previous year.  Judge Bonomy also analyzed the 
Justice Case.  He wrote: 
The Military Tribunal appears to have imposed 
criminal responsibility on both accused for their 
participation in the common criminal plan although 
they did not perpetrate the actus reus of the crimes 
of which they were convicted; the actus reus was 
instead perpetrated by executioners simply carrying 
out the orders of the court.  Nowhere did the Tribu-
nal discuss the mental state of the executioners who 
carried out the death sentences imposed as a result 
of the actions of Lautz, Rothaug, and their fellow 
participants in the common plan, or whether such 
persons even had knowledge that the death sen-
tences formed part of a plan to pervert the law for 
the purpose of exterminating Jews and other ‘unde-
sirables.’75 
¶37 The other post-World War II case referred to by the Brđanin 
Appeals Chamber, and discussed by Judge Bonomy in his separate 
opinion, involved the SS Race and Resettlement Main Office, and 
is known as the RuSHA case.  The RuSHA leaders were charged 
with participating in a “systematic program of genocide.”76  As 
Judge Bonomy explained, the United States Military Tribunal con-
                                                 
73 Brđanin Appeals Judgment, supra note 71, ¶ 397 (citing Justice Trial, 3 
T.W.C. 1, p. 1063). 
74 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 98 n.114 
(June 12, 2002). 
75 Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Decision on Ojdanic’s Mo-
tion Challenging Jurisdiction: Indirect Co-Perpetrations, Separate Opinion of 
Judge Iain Bonomy, ¶ 20 (Mar. 22, 2006). 
76 U.S. v. Greifelt (“RuSHA Case”), 4 T.W.C. 1, p. 609, 13 L.R.T.W.C. 1 (U.S. 
Mil. Trib. 1948). 
             A T R O C I T Y  C R I ME S  L I T I G A T I O N  Y E A R - I N - R E V I E W       [Vol.  6  
 
402
cluded that Hitler, SS leader Himmler and other Nazi officials 
shared a “two-fold objective of weakening and eventually destroy-
ing other nations while at the same time strengthening Germany, 
territorially and biologically, at the expense of conquered na-
tions.”77  The leadership of RuSHA adhered to and enthusiastically 
participated in the execution of this ‘Germanization plan.’78 
¶38 The Appeals Chamber agreed that the RuSHA Judgment 
supported the position that high officials involved in devising the 
Germanization plan were criminally responsible for the conduct of 
the agents who carried out the crimes, “without any discussion of 
whether the principal perpetrators had knowledge that their actions 
formed part of the Germanization plan, or of whether an agreement 
existed between the accused and these agents.”79  The Brđanin Ap-
peals Chamber also noted that much of the early case law of the 
ICTY dealt with small-scale joint criminal enterprises, and was not 
therefore good authority when broader schemes were concerned.80  
It referred to two exceptions, both of them involving senior lead-
ers.81 
B. The AFRC Judgment at the SCSL 
¶39 Another significant development in 2007 concerning joint 
criminal enterprise was the dismissal, by a Trial Chamber of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, of charges because of the manner 
in which the concept was pleaded.  The indictment had charged 
three leaders of the Armed Forced Revolutionary Council as fol-
lows: 
33. The AFRC, including ALEX TAMBA BRIMA, 
BRIMA BAZZY KAMARA and SANTIGIE 
BORBOR KANU, and the RUF, including ISSA 
HASSAN SESAY, MORRIS KALLON and 
                                                 
77 Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Decision on Ojdanic’s Mo-
tion Challenging Jurisdiction: Indirect Co-Perpetrations, Separate Opinion of 
Judge Iain Bonomy, ¶ 22 (Mar. 22, 2006) (citing RuSHA Case, 4 T.W.C. 1, p. 
90). 
78 Id. 
79 Brđanin Appeals Judgment, supra note 71, ¶ 403. 
80 Id. ¶ 407.   
81 Id. ¶¶ 408-9 (citing Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Judg-
ment (Mar. 22, 2006); Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals 
Judgment (Apr. 19, 2004)). 
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AUGUSTINE GBAO, shared a common plan, pur-
pose or design (joint criminal enterprise) which was 
to take any actions necessary to gain and exercise 
political power and control over the territory of Si-
erra Leone, in particular the diamond mining areas.  
The natural resources of Sierra Leone, in particular 
the diamonds, were to be provided to persons out-
side Sierra Leone in return for assistance in carrying 
out the joint criminal enterprise. 
34. The joint criminal enterprise included gaining 
and exercising control over the population of Sierra 
Leone in order to prevent or minimize resistance to 
their geographic control, and to use members of the 
population to provide support to the members of the 
joint criminal enterprise.  The crimes alleged in this 
Indictment, including unlawful killings, abductions, 
forced labour, physical and sexual violence, use of 
child soldiers, looting and burning of civilian struc-
tures, were either actions within the joint criminal 
enterprise or were a reasonably foreseeable conse-
quence of the joint criminal enterprise.82 
The Trial Chamber took the view that paragraphs 33 and 34 of the 
indictment did not disclose a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court as a common purpose of the joint enterprise.  It departed 
from a preliminary ruling that had upheld the validity of the in-
dictment.  According to the Trial Chamber, the charge that the ac-
cused took “actions necessary to gain and exercise political power 
and control over the territory of Sierra Leone, in particular the 
diamond mining areas” is not a criminal purpose recognized by the 
Tribunal’s Statute nor is it an international crime.83  “Whether to 
prosecute the perpetrators of rebellion for their act of rebellion and 
challenge to the constituted authority of the State as a matter of 
internal law is for the state authority to decide,” it explained.  
“There is no rule against rebellion in international law.”84 
                                                 
82 Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, Further Amended Consoli-
dated Indictment, ¶¶ 33-34 (May 13, 2004). 
83 Brima Trial Judgment, supra note 27, ¶ 67.  
84 Id. 
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¶40 The same issue also arose in the second judgment of the 
Special Court, which was issued in August 2007.  There, the 
Prosecutor had charged a different type of joint criminal enterprise, 
namely using “any means necessary to defeat the RUF/AFRC 
forces and to gain and exercise control over the territory of Sierra 
Leone.  This included gaining complete control over the population 
of Sierra Leone and the complete elimination of the RUF/AFRC, 
its supporters, sympathizers, and anyone who did not actively re-
sist the RUF/AFRC occupation of Sierra Leone.”85  The indictment 
did not use the term ‘joint criminal enterprise,’ but the Trial 
Chamber seemed to consider that the words “plan, purpose or de-
sign” which did appear in paragraph 19 of the indictment were suf-
ficient.86  Perhaps the Prosecutor did not describe the enterprise as 
‘criminal’ because this case involved the Civil Defence Forces, 
who were defending the regime.  The Trial Chamber concluded 
that although “Norman, Fofana, Kondewa and their subordinates 
may have acted in concert with each other, we find that there is no 
evidence upon which to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that 
they did so in order to further a common purpose, plan or design to 
commit criminal acts.”87  The discussion was perfunctory, and 
there is little guidance either about the nature of the ‘joint criminal 
enterprise’ allegedly charged by the Prosecutor or the Trial Cham-
ber’s reasons for dismissing it.  Hopefully the Appeals Chamber 
will sort things out, as the matter may be of decisive importance in 
the Charles Taylor trial, now ongoing in 2008. 
VI. SOME PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS 
¶41 The tribunals have been at work now for more than a decade.  
Very sophisticated rules and principles concerning procedure and 
evidence have been developed over this time.  Often they represent 
compromises based upon practice in different legal traditions.  
Novel problems do, however, continue to present themselves.  
Three developments in this area will be discussed: (1) the issue of 
‘witness proofing,’ (2) a possible exception to the right of the ac-
cused to be present at trial, and (3) the ‘confirmation hearing’ at 
the International Criminal Court. 
                                                 
85 Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-03-14-I, Indictment, ¶ 19 (Feb. 5, 
2004). 
86 Fofana Trial Judgment, supra note 24, ¶ 217. 
87  Id. ¶¶ 732, 744, 771, 804, 815, 907, 908, 914, 915, 939, 940, 949, 950.  
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A. Witness Proofing 
¶42 Witness proofing is a practice by which counsel prepare a 
witness for testimony.  Some systems prohibit it altogether, others 
tolerate it to a certain extent, and in some systems, especially in the 
United States, the practice is both widespread and subject to rela-
tively few constraints.  It has become a feature of the work of the 
Office of the Prosecutor at the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL.88  The de-
bate about witness proofing was revived in 2006, when a Pre-Trial 
Chamber of the ICC essentially condemned the practice at the ad 
hoc tribunals and forbade lawyers from coaching their witnesses 
beyond telling them where to find the courthouse door, the toilets 
and the coffee machine.89  The decision nourished attempts by de-
fense lawyers to overturn precedent and have the ad hoc tribunals 
follow the line set by the ICC, but to no avail.90  In May 2007, the 
Appeals Chamber of the ICTR confirmed that there would be no 
change in the law before that body.91  The authoritative Appeals 
Chamber decision was then invoked by the Prosecutor before a 
Trial Chamber of the ICC in the hopes that it would reverse the 
earlier decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber.  But the Trial Chamber 
refused to budge.92  Referring to the rulings of the ad hoc tribunals 
on the same subject, it said: 
44. However, this precedent is in no sense binding 
on the Trial Chamber at this Court.  Article 21 of 
                                                 
88 See Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10, Decision on Communication 
between Parties and Witnesses (Trial Chamber, Dec. 11, 1998); Prosecutor v, 
Limaj, Case No IT-03-66-T, Decision on the Defence Motion on Prosecution 
Practice of Proofing Witnesses (Trial Chamber II, Dec. 10, 2004); Prosecutor v. 
Sesay, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-T, Decision on the Defence Motion for the Ex-
clusion of Certain Portions of Supplemental Statements of Witness TF1-117 
(Trial Chamber I, Feb. 27, 2006). 
89 See generally Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06-679, Decision on the Practices of Witness Familiarisation and Witness 
Proofing, Public (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Nov. 8, 2006). 
90 See generally Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on 
Defence Motions to Prohibit Witness Proofing (Trial Chamber III, Dec. 15, 
2006); Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Decision on Ojdanić 
Motion to Prohibit Witness Proofing (Trial Chamber, Dec. 12, 2006). 
91 Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73.8, Decision on Inter-
locutory Appeal Regarding Witness Proofing (Appeals Chamber, May 11, 
2007). 
92 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1049, Deci-
sion Regarding the Practices Used to Prepare and Familiarise Witnesses for Giv-
ing Testimony at Trial, Public, ¶ 56-57 (Trial Chamber I, Nov. 30, 2007). 
             A T R O C I T Y  C R I ME S  L I T I G A T I O N  Y E A R - I N - R E V I E W       [Vol.  6  
 
406
the Statute requires the Chamber to apply first the 
Statute, Elements of Crimes and Rules of the ICC.  
Thereafter, if ICC legislation is not definitive on the 
issue, the Trial Chamber should apply, where ap-
propriate, principles and rules of international law.  
In the instant case, the issue before the Chamber is 
procedural in nature.  While this would not, ipso 
facto, prevent all procedural issues from scrutiny 
under Article 21(l)(b), the Chamber does not con-
sider the procedural rules and jurisprudence of the 
ad hoc Tribunals to be automatically applicable to 
the ICC without detailed analysis. 
45. The ICC Statute has, through important ad-
vances, created a procedural framework which dif-
fers markedly from the ad hoc tribunals, such as, for 
example, in the requirement in the Statute that the 
prosecution should investigate exculpatory as well 
as incriminatory evidence, for which the Statute and 
Rules of the ad hoc tribunals do not provide.  Also, 
the Statute seemingly permits greater intervention 
by the Bench, as well as introducing the unique 
element of victim participation.  Therefore, the Stat-
ute moves away from the procedural regime of the 
ad hoc tribunals, introducing additional and novel 
elements to aid the process of establishing the truth.  
Thus, the procedure of preparation of witnesses be-
fore trial is not easily transferable into the system of 
law created by the ICC Statute and Rules.  There-
fore, while acknowledging the importance of con-
sidering the practice and jurisprudence at the ad hoc 
tribunals, the Chamber is not persuaded that the ap-
plication of ad hoc procedures, in the context of 
preparation of witnesses for trial, is appropriate.93 
¶43 Thus, there is a significant rift in the procedural law applied 
by the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals.  The issue is a relatively mi-
nor one, but the willingness of judges at the ICC to depart from 
earlier precedent may portend future innovations and develop-
                                                 
93  Id. ¶ 44-45 (emphasis omitted).  
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ments.  Reliance upon legal points decided by the ad hoc tribunals 
may not help to clinch any arguments before the ICC which, 
clearly, has a mind of its own.  Some will see this as a troublesome 
source of legal uncertainty.  On the other hand, it enriches the law 
and gives it dynamism.  International criminal law may be the bet-
ter for it. 
B. The Right of the Defendant to be Present at Trial 
¶44 The right of the defendant to be present at trial is set out in 
the statutes of all of the international tribunals, in language bor-
rowed from article 14(3) of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.94  According to the Appeals Chamber of the 
ICTR, “the physical presence of an accused before the court, as a 
general rule, is one of the most basic and common precepts of a 
fair criminal trial.”  The Appeals Chamber has pointed to the clar-
ity of the language and practical import of Article 20(4)(d) of the 
Statute (equivalent provisions appear in the statutes of the other 
two ad hoc tribunals): “First, as a matter of ordinary English, the 
term ‘presence’ implies physical proximity.  A review of the 
French version of the Statute leads to the same conclusion, in par-
ticular in the context of the phrase ‘être présente au process,’ con-
veying unambiguously that Article 20(4)(d) refers to physical pres-
ence at the trial.’95  Moreover, a form of ‘constructive presence,’ 
such as attendance by video-link, is no substitute for physical pres-
ence, and cannot be imposed upon a defendant.96 
¶45 Nevertheless, in 2007, confronted with a short-term illness of 
an accused, a Trial Chamber of the ICTR decided to proceed in his 
absence.  The Trial Chamber had justified its exception to the prin-
ciple of presence at trial by balancing this with the need to ensure 
an expeditious trial.  It was overturned by the Appeals Chamber, 
but not because as a matter of principle it would be forbidden to 
proceed where an accused was absent through no choice or fault of 
his or her own.  Rather, the Appeals Chamber accepted the Trial 
Chamber’s balancing test, but held that the minimal, three-day de-
                                                 
94 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6316, at art. 14(1) (1966). 
95 Zigiranyirazo v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-AR73, Decision on In-
terlocutory Appeal, ¶ 11 (Appeals Chamber, Oct. 30, 2006) (citations omitted). 
96 Id. ¶ 12. 
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lay to the trial resulting from the accused’s illness did not outweigh 
the accused’s right to be present at his own trial when his absence 
was due to no fault of his own.97   
¶46 Although in absentia trials as such have been rejected as an 
option—in the case of the ICC quite explicitly98—there is no short-
age of authority for the proposition that a defendant may waive the 
right to be present at trial under specific circumstances.  For exam-
ple, a defendant before the ICTY attended portions of his trial by 
video-link due to illness, but his right to physical presence was ex-
plicitly waived.99  Waiver may also take place where a defendant 
wilfully and substantially obstructs the proceedings.100  Some de-
fendants have chosen to boycott proceedings, as a form of protest 
against rulings by the bench.  Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza refused to 
attend his trial before the ICTR.  He issued a statement “refusing to 
associate himself with a show trial” and insisting that “the ICTR 
was manipulated by the current Rwandan government and the 
judges and the prosecutors were the hostage[s] of Kigali.”101 
¶47 Barayagwiza unsuccessfully raised the matter on appeal, 
where he argued that nothing in the Statute or the Rules authorized 
proceedings in his absence.  During the appeals hearing, his coun-
sel suggested that the Tribunal might have brought him to court 
physically in order to ensure his presence at trial.102  In its Novem-
ber 2007 ruling, the Appeals Chamber observed that the Secretary-
General’s report of May 3, 1993 did not oppose the idea that a trial 
might proceed in the absence of a defendant who refused to appear.  
The famous reference in the report to in absentia trials was ad-
dressed to individuals who had not yet been apprehended by the 
Tribunal.103  According to the Appeals Chamber, an accused person 
can renounce his or her presence at trial providing this is “libre, 
                                                 
97 Prosecutor v. Nzirorera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73.10, Decision on Nzi-
rorera’s Interlocutory Appeal Concerning his Right to be Present at Trial, ¶ 15 
(Appeals Chamber, Oct. 5, 2007). 
98 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 64. 
99 Prosecutor v. Simić, Case No. IT 95-9/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 8 (Trial 
Chamber II, Oct. 17, 2002). 
100 Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocu-
tory Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense 
Counsel, ¶ 13 (Appeals Chamber, Nov. 1, 2004). 
101 Mercedeh Momeni, Why Barayagwiza is Boycotting his Trial at the ICTR: 
Lessons in Balancing Due Process Rights and Politics, 7 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 315, 315-16 (2001). 
102 Nahimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 45, ¶ 89 n.186.  
103 Nahimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 45, ¶ 98.  
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non équivoque (même si elle peut être expresse ou tacite) et faite 
en connaissance de cause.”104  It noted that these were the same 
criteria applicable to renunciation by a suspect of the right to be 
assisted by counsel during questioning, pursuant to Rule 42(B),105 
and to the validity of a renunciation by an accused person of the 
protection against self-incrimination.106  The Appeals Chamber 
said an accused must have received notice of the date and place of 
the trial, and of the charges against him or her, and the right to be 
present at trial.  Moreover, where an accused who is in custody re-
fuses to attend, the interests of justice require that counsel be des-
ignated.107  Barayagwiza’s appeal on grounds that he had not been 
present at trial was therefore dismissed, given that he had voluntar-
ily waived his right. 
C. Confirmation Hearings at the ICC 
¶48 In January 2007, a Pre-Trial Chamber of the International 
Criminal Court issued its first decision following a ‘confirmation 
hearing.’  In November and December, it had heard evidence con-
cerning charges against Thomas Lubanga.  The proceeding itself, 
which is authorized by Article 61 of the Rome Statute, is novel, 
and there is no real equivalent in the procedure of the earlier inter-
national criminal tribunals.108  Ostensibly the purpose is to protect 
the defendant against abusive and unfounded accusations.109  At the 
confirmation hearing, the Prosecutor is required to support each 
charge with sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to 
believe that the person committed the crime charged.  The Prose-
                                                 
104 Id. ¶ 109.  The sentence might be translated as follows: ‘free and unequivocal 
(although it may be implied or express), and informed.’ 
105 Id. n.220 (citing Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision 
on Prosecutor’s Motion for the Admission of Certain Materials under Rule 
89(C), ¶¶ 18-19 (Trial Chamber I, Oct. 14, 2004). 
106 Id. n.220 (citing Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Decision on 
Vidoje Blagojević’s Oral Request, ¶ 8 (Trial Chamber I, July 30, 2004); Prose-
cutor v. Halilović, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Decision on Motion for Exclusion of 
Statement of Accused, ¶¶ 22-23 (Trial Chamber I, July 8, 2005)). 
107 Id. 
108 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 61(1). 
109 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Décision 
sur la confirmation des charges, Public Redacted Version with Annex I, ¶ 37 
(Pre-Trial Chamber I, Jan. 29, 2007) [hereinafter Lubanga Decision on the Con-
firmation of Charges]. 
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cutor is entitled to rely on documentary or summary evidence and 
need not call the witnesses expected to testify at the trial.110 
¶49 Although it confirmed the charges against Lubanga, Pre-
Trial Chamber I criticized the Prosecutor’s first “document con-
taining the charges”111 for not providing a more detailed descrip-
tion of the context in which the alleged crimes had taken place.112 
¶50 The confirmation hearing seems to resemble preliminary 
hearings held under common law procedure in many jurisdictions.  
It allows the Court to ensure that a prosecution is not frivolous and 
that there is sufficient evidence for a finding of guilt, thereby pro-
tecting the accused from prosecutorial abuse.  From the standpoint 
of the defendant, it also provides a useful opportunity to be in-
formed of important evidence in the possession of the prosecution 
and even to test the value of such evidence, at least in a superficial 
way, during a judicial proceeding.  Where the Statute is not clear is 
in the usefulness of submitting defense evidence during the con-
firmation hearing.  While the Statute invites the defense to present 
evidence at this stage, it is not obvious that contradictory evidence 
adduced by the defense can have any effect upon the determination 
of the existence of ‘sufficient evidence.’  The Pre-Trial Chamber 
may well decide that whether or not defense evidence raises doubts 
about the validity of Prosecution evidence is a matter for the trial 
court and not a pre-trial issue. 
¶51 The most dramatic conclusion of the confirmation hearing 
was the decision by the Pre-Trial Chamber to add to the charges 
against Lubanga.  Lubanga was charged with child soldier of-
fenses, which are set out in two provisions of the Rome Statute, 
one of which is applicable to international armed conflict and the 
other to non-international armed conflict.  There are slight differ-
ences between the two, but they are broadly similar.  Although the 
Prosecutor had initially requested issuance of an arrest warrant 
with respect to both provisions,113 when he issued formal charges 
against Lubanga in August 2006, the provision concerning interna-
                                                 
110 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 61(5). 
111 See id. art. 61(3)(a); Regulations of the Court, adopted on 26 May 2004 by 
the Judges of the Court, Fifth Plenary Session, ICC-BD/01-01-04, Chapter 5, 
The Hague, 17-28 May 2004, at Reg. 52.  In deference to judicial pluralism, the 
Rome Statute does not use the term ‘indictment.’ 
112  Lubanga Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 109, ¶153.  
113 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Deci-
sion on the Prosecutor's Application for warrant of arrest, Art. 58, Confidential 
(Pre-Trial Chamber I, Feb. 10 2006).   
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tional armed conflict was not invoked.114  The Pre-Trial Chamber 
did not see the reason for this, and decided to ‘confirm’ charges 
against Lubanga with respect to both international and non-
international armed conflict. 
¶52 The Prosecutor objected strenuously, arguing in effect that 
the Pre-Trial Chamber had acted ultra vires.  Its role under the 
Statute, he contended, was to ‘confirm’ charges and not to intro-
duce new ones.  By adding new charges to the case, the judges 
were unacceptably interfering in matters of prosecutorial discre-
tion.115  The Pre-Trial Chamber denied the Prosecutor’s application 
for leave to appeal its decision.116 
¶53 The entire proceeding of the confirmation hearing consumed 
many months, and undoubtedly delayed the start of the trial, 
scheduled for March 31, 2008.  When Lubanga’s trial begins, it 
will be able to take credit for the longest pre-trial period of any of 
the international criminal tribunals dealing with its first case.117  
The ICTY started its first trial, of Dusko Tadić, on May 7, 1996, 
slightly over a year after the date when he was taken into custody.  
The Rwanda Tribunal began its first trial, of Jean-Paul Akeyesu, 
on January 9, 1997, less than eight months after the accused had 
been brought to Arusha.118  The Special Court for Sierra Leone be-
gan its first trial, of the three Civil Defence Forces defendants, on 
June 3, 2004, fifteen months after their arrest.  The average is 
somewhat less than a year.  Thus, the ICC, with twenty-five 
months from arrest to the beginning of trial, is by far the slowest of 
them all, and the confirmation hearing is part of the explanation for 
this regrettable situation.  Legitimate questions arise about the real 
                                                 
114 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-356, 
Submission of the Document Containing the Charges pursuant to Article 
61(3)(a) and of the List of Evidence pursuant to Rule 121(3), Public Document 
with Ex Parte, Confidential and Public Annexes, (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Aug. 28, 
2006).  
115 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-806, 
Application for Leave to Appeal Pre-Trial Chamber I's 29 January 2007 « Déci-
sion sur la confirmation des charges », Public, ¶¶ 2-3 (Feb. 5, 2007).   
116 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-915, Deci-
sion on the Prosecution and Defence applications for leave to appeal the Deci-
sion on the confirmation of charges, Public, at 21 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, May 24, 
2007).  
117 See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶¶ 10, 
27 (Trial Chamber II, May 7, 1997). 
118 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 11, 17 (Trial 
Chamber I, Sept. 2, 1998). 
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utility of this additional pre-trial step, given its cost in terms of 
lengthening the overall proceedings.  It appears to have added little 
or nothing to the knowledge of the evidence by the defense, which 
is in any case addressed by the disclosure obligations upon the 
Prosecutor.  If the Review Conference on the Rome Statute takes a 
pragmatic approach, it might decide to eliminate the confirmation 
hearing.  Alternatively, it might attempt to circumscribe the scope 
of the hearing so that it does not take many months of preparation, 
weeks of hearing time, and two months for the drafting of a 
lengthy decision. 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
¶54 A decade ago, an essay on significant developments over the 
previous twelve months in international criminal prosecutions 
would have been a modest affair.  The International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia had entered its first conviction 
following a contested trial.119  Its Appeals Chamber had issued two 
interlocutory decisions, although the results were not very well re-
ceived by the international community, and they were effectively 
overturned by provisions of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, adopted the following July.120  The Rwanda Tri-
bunal had yet to render any judgment on the merits, and its only 
significant case law for 1997 consisted of an interlocutory ruling 
on jurisdiction that largely echoed the famous Tadić decision of the 
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia.121  Neither the International Criminal Court nor 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone existed at the time. 
                                                 
119 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment (Trial 
Chamber, May 7, 1997). 
120 See generally Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate 
Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah (Oct. 7, 1997) (whose conclu-
sion that the defense of duress was unavailable in the case of crimes against hu-
manity was rejected by the Rome Conference, see Rome Statute, supra note 2, 
art. 31(1)(d)); see also Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-AR108bis, 
Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision 
of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997 (Appeals Chamber, Oct. 29, 1997) (whose 
conclusion that the international tribunal would be the ultimate arbiter in cases 
where states invoked national security concerns as a reason for not cooperating 
was rejected by the Rome Conference, see Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 72). 
121 Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, Decision on the Defence 
Motion on Jurisdiction, ¶ 27 (Trial Chamber II, June 18, 1997) 
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¶55 Ten years later, the volume of case law is enormous.  The 
Sierra Leone Special Court alone in 2007 accounted for two mas-
sive judgments, totaling more than 1,000 pages.  This article has 
thus necessarily addressed only a selection of the important find-
ings of the Tribunals in the course of 2007.  Other points of con-
siderable interest include: the rejection of the concept of ‘forced 
marriage’ as an autonomous category of crimes against human-
ity;122 rulings clarifying the extent of victim participation in pro-
ceedings before the International Criminal Court;123 an order by a 
Trial Chamber that a sum of money be paid to a defendant in com-
pensation for procedural abuses;124 payment of defense costs for a 
self-represented accused;125 whether the Appeals Chamber has the 
authority to reopen proceedings after a final judgment has been 
issued;126 conviction and sentencing to a term of imprisonment of a 
witness for contempt of court;127 a narrow construction of crimes 
against humanity by which combatants including those hors de 
combat are not encompassed within the expression ‘civilian popu-
lation;’128 a finding that a non-guided high dispersion missile, the 
M-87 Orkan, that was incapable of hitting specific targets by virtue 
of its characteristics and the firing range in the specific instance, 
                                                 
122 See Brima Trial Judgment, supra note 27, ¶¶ 702-707; see also id., Partly 
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Doherty on Count 7 (Sexual Slavery) and Count 8 
(‘Forced Marriages’).  
123 See Situation in Uganda, Situation No. ICC-02/04-101, Decision on Victims’ 
Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to 
1/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, Public Redacted Version (Pre-Trial 
Chamber II,  Aug. 10, 2007); Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. ICC-
02/05-110, Decision on the Requests of the OPCD on the Production of Rele-
vant Supporting Documentation Pursuant to Regulation 86(2)(e) of the Regula-
tions of the Court and on the Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials by the Prose-
cutor, Public (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Dec. 3, 2007).   
124 Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-T, Decision on Appropri-
ate Remedy, at 23 (Trial Chamber III, Jan. 31, 2007), aff’d, Prosecutor v. Rwa-
makuba Case No. ICTR-98-44C-A, Decision on Appeal against Decision on 
Appropriate Remedy, ¶ 31 (Appeals Chamber, Sept. 13, 2007).  
125 See generally Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67, Decision on Imple-
menting the Financing of the Accused (Trial Chamber III, Oct. 30, 2007). 
126 See generally Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-Misc.1, Decision on 
Strugar’s Request to Reopen Appeal Proceedings (Appeals Chamber, June 7, 
2007). 
127 Prosecutor v. GAA, Case No. ICTR-07-90-R77-I, Judgment and Sentence, at 
6 (Trial Chamber III, Dec. 4 2007). 
128 See Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 461 (Trial 
Chamber II, Sept. 27, 2007); see also Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-
14-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 693-694 (Trial Chamber I, Aug. 2, 2007).   
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was an indiscriminate weapon;129 and the suggestion that shelling a 
city might constitute a lawful reprisal (although rejected in the spe-
cific circumstances of the case).130 
¶56 This body of law is now probably the most dynamic area in 
public international law.  In addition to the work of the ad hoc tri-
bunals, important rulings and legal developments with respect to 
both substantive and procedural law have taken place before spe-
cialized ‘hybrid’ institutions, like the Extraordinary Chambers of 
the Courts of Cambodia, and exclusively national courts.  The 
richness of accumulated experience and the increasing advocacy 
skills of practitioners manifest themselves in submissions of both 
prosecution and defense, not to mention the abundant case law.  
¶57 International criminal justice is a costly business.  All of this 
activity would not take place without the commitments of govern-
ments to the funding of the institutions, as well as to investments 
within their own domestic justice systems.  To this extent, the con-
tinued existence and growth of international criminal justice crimes 
is dependent upon political decisions, which are in turn dependent 
upon the support of the populace.  At present, this shows no signs 
of flagging.  In order to maintain this support, international justice 
will have to continue to demonstrate serious and credible results 
that contribute both to accountability for atrocities and also to the 
promotion of peace and social stability. 
 
                                                 
129 Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment, ¶ 463 (Trial Chamber 
I, June 12, 2007). 
130 Id. ¶ 468. 
